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HOW RADICAL IS REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE?
REMARKS FOR THE FIU LAW REVIEW SYMPOSIUM
Rachel Rebouché*
INTRODUCTION
In a recent documentary, one the founders of the reproductive justice
movement, Loretta Ross, described reproductive justice in this way: “We
took reproductive rights and social justice and combined them. We came
up with reproductive justice, and we always had human rights in mind.”1
Ross’s statement aligns reproductive justice with social justice and human
rights movements. It also makes another, perhaps more subtle but
frequently repeated, claim—that human rights and social justice projects are
one and the same. Reproductive justice writings presume that human rights
provide a vision for progressive law reform.
And, indeed, human rights have been catalysts for legal and political
transformation in many places and for many people.2 But the reproductive
justice movement has embraced human rights without incorporating any
skepticism of modern human rights law, despite reproductive justice’s
sophisticated critique of rights-based approaches in mainstream U.S.
reproductive politics.3 I argue this is, in part, because reproductive justice
advocates view human rights as the more robust alternative to U.S.
constitutional rights, especially in the context of abortion litigation.
However, the focus on law reform and courts, on the priorities of the global
North, and on identity instead of redistribution undercuts the commitments
that set reproductive justice apart from reproductive rights.
My talk today is an exploration of how human rights and reproductive
justice intersect at this moment in U.S. advocacy. In what follows, I make
four arguments. First, the human rights regime has embraced reproductive

∗ Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. Many thanks to the editors of
the FIU LAW REVIEW and the organizers of the Review’s 2016 Symposium, especially Gisselle Perez,
Helen Sayers, and Rebecca Bovinet. Thanks also to Professor Cyra Choudhury, who proposed the
symposium and provided invaluable feedback at different stages of this research. These remarks are
based on and draw from a forthcoming article, The Intersection of Human Rights and Reproductive
Justice, in volume 7 of the UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW.
1
BIRTHRIGHT: A WAR STORY (Civia Tamarkin 2016).
2
See Rachel Rebouché, Abortion Rights as Human Rights, 25 SOC. LEGAL STUD. 765, 767–70
(2016) (demonstrating an emerging international consensus around abortion rights as human rights)
[hereinafter Abortion Rights as Human Rights].
3
See Rachel Rebouché, The Intersection of Human Rights and Reproductive Justice, 7 UC
IRVINE L. REV. Part III (forthcoming 2017) (describing literature that is critical of human rights law).
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rights through international declarations and the decisions of treatymonitoring bodies. Second, national courts and international committees
have helped transplant human rights arguments into conversations about
abortion law reform by relying on the principles of universality, consensus,
and balancing. Third, the reproductive justice movement persuasively has
contested U.S. advocates’ conventional focus on constitutional litigation
and abortion rights, and it has directed attention to the reproductive health
needs of women of color and other marginalized populations. Reproductive
justice strategies seek not only to be intersectional, but also address a
spectrum of reproductive issues through grassroots and community
engagement. And fourth, the representations of human rights in
reproductive justice materials may contradict the movement’s commitment
to the fair distribution of health resources—a goal that emergent health
justice research also takes as its priority. I conclude that the reproductive
justice movement may lose some of its radical potential by referring to
human rights and social justice as interchangeable.
I.

The International Landscape

Reproductive rights have advanced significantly at the level of
international human rights law, both in the process of drafting conventions
or declarations and in the interpretation of human rights texts. Examples
span the last thirty years, from the 1994 International Conference on
Population and Development (ICPD) and the 1995 Fourth World
Conference on Women (FWCW) to recent declarations on reproductive
rights.4 Specifically, tying early terminations or terminations for certain
reasons to women’s rights to equality, autonomy, and dignity helped
establish abortion as a human right.5 Now treaty-monitoring bodies make
clearer and stronger statements in support of abortion rights,6 and have
4
U.N. International Conference on Population and Development, Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development, Principle 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (Sept. 13,
1994), http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/event-pdf/icpd_eng_2.pdf; Fourth World Conference on
Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, annex I (Sept. 15, 1995), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf
/Beijing%20full%20report%20E.pdf. For an example of a contemporary human rights standard on
reproductive rights, see U.N. Conference on Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean, Montevideo Consensus on Population and Development, Priority Action 42, 2013,
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/Montevideo%20Consensus-15Aug2013.pdf.
5
Rebecca J. Cook & Bernard M. Dickens, Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform, 25
HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 2–3 (2003); Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right—
International and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 256–60 (2008); Martha F. Davis,
Abortion Access in the Global Marketplace, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1657, 1674 (2010); Lance Gable,
Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957, 968 (2010).
6
Kelsey Zorzi, The Impact of the United Nations on National Abortion Laws, 65 CATH. U. L.

02- REBOUCHE 4.24.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

How Radical is Reproductive Justice?

5/9/17 6:05 PM

11

looked to international human rights law to support terminations when a
woman’s life or health is at risk, in instances of rape or incest, and when
there is a threat of a serious fetal medical condition.7 For instance, the right
to life and the right to health underpin an abortion to save a woman’s life or
to protect her physical and mental health; rights to bodily integrity or
freedom from inhumane treatment support terminations on the grounds of
rape, incest, and severe fetal anomaly.8 On the national level, since the
ICPD and the FWCW, over thirty countries have legalized or expanded
access to abortion whereas only eleven countries have restricted abortion
permission.9
To be sure, there is not an international consensus around permitting
abortion on request (for socio-economic reasons, for example) or later in
pregnancy. But international support for first-trimester terminations or
abortion on particular grounds is a sizable step forward from the ICPD in
1994 and the FWCW in 1995. Rather than urging states to ensure women’s
access to safe abortion when legal, human rights documents recommend
that states decriminalize termination services.10 The mantra “reproductive
rights are human rights” has evolved from an aspirational statement to a
reflection of contemporary international law and policy.11

REV. 409, 416, nn.48–49 (2015). The CEDAW Committee interpreted CEDAW’s rights to equality and
health as supporting women’s right to safe abortions. The Committee’s General Recommendation 24
pressed states to amend, “when possible, legislation criminalizing abortion . . . and [to] remove punitive
provisions imposed on women who undergo abortion.” U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the
Convention (Women and Health), ¶ 31(c), U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I, (1999),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a73.html.
7
Zampas & Gher, supra note 5, at 251.
8
Id. at 249; ROSALIND DIXON & MARTHA NUSSBAUM, Abortion, Dignity and a Capabilities
Approach, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 7 (Beverley Baines, Daphne
Barak-Erez, & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2012).
9
Zorzi, supra note 6, at 414.
10 For example, a 2011 report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health states: “Criminal laws
penalizing and restricting induced abortion are the paradigmatic examples of impermissible barriers to
the realization of women’s right to health and must be eliminated.” Dainius Pūras (Special Rapporteur
on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health), Interim Report on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of
Physical and Mental Health, Recommendations ¶ IV.1.21, U.N. Doc. A/66/15 (Aug. 3, 2011). The
Rapporteur recommends that “legal and safe abortion services [be] available, accessible, and of good
quality.” Id. ¶ IV.1.29.
11
See MINDY JANE ROSEMAN & LAURA REICHENBACH, Global Reproductive Health and
Rights: Reflecting on the ICPD, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE WAY FORWARD
17 (Laura Reichenbach & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2009); Rhonda Copelon, Remarks of Rhonda
Copelon, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1253, 1253 (1995); Eva Brems, Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural
Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human Rights Discourse, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 136, 152 (1997); Nancy
Northup, Reproductive Rights at Home and Abroad, 15 CUNY L. REV. 265, 265 (2012); Alma Beltrán y
Puga, Paradigmatic Changes in Gender Justice: The Advancement of Reproductive Rights in
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Human Rights Arguments for Law Reform

Human rights arguments have been persuasive to treaty-monitoring
bodies and national courts, even when there are stark differences among
those forums.12 In this presentation, I highlight three ways in which human
rights arguments support transnational as well as national abortion law
reform.
First, courts tie abortion rights to universal, interdependent values
associated with the advancement of women’s equality and autonomy.13
Feminist scholars and activists have made the case that abortion rights are
fundamental to ensuring women’s equal standing with men—that control
over the number, spacing, and timing of pregnancy permits women to
pursue equality in public and private life (seeking education or employment
and negotiating caretaking roles) and to resist traditional stereotypes of
women as mothers.14 Second, courts depend on human rights as a mode of
communicating modern agreement among states, either to situate a country
within a regional consensus or to explain why a country’s law is retrograde
in comparison to its neighbors.15 Moreover, international reports or
declarations, like the ICPD, describe laws permitting abortion as indicators
of states’ commitment to women’s rights.16 And third, courts deploy
human rights protections as a shield to anti-abortion opposition by
balancing women’s rights and fetal rights. Said another way, courts weigh
women’s human rights against the competing interests of potential life.17
International Human Rights Law, 3 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L. J. 146, 148 (2012).
12
See Abortion Rights as Human Rights, supra note 2, at 771–74. For national approaches to
abortion law reform, see generally ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND
CONTROVERSIES 177 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman, & Bernard M. Dickens eds., 2014).
13
A 2009 decision of the Supreme Court of Nepal described an interdependent group of
women’s rights that support permitting abortion and located abortion rights as part of the state’s human
rights duties. In upholding revisions to Nepalese penal code, the court wrote, “Reproductive rights are
considered to be an inseparable part of women’s human rights and within that the right to abortion is
seen to hold an important place . . . the rights guaranteed to women under international treaties, the
constitution and other laws would become unachievable [without reproductive rights].” Lakshmi Dhikta
& Others v. Government of Nepal, Writ No. 0757, Jestha, 2066 ¶¶ 32–34 (2009) (Supreme Court of
Nepal). See also Abortion Rights as Human Rights, supra note 2, at 771–72.
14
Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity in Transnational Debates over
Abortion and Same-Sex Marriage, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 355, 355 (2012).
15
A 2010 case decided by the Constitutional Court of Portugal provides an example of
consensus-based justifications that are rooted in an appeal to modernity. In comparing Portugal’s newly
liberalized abortion law to the laws of neighboring countries, the Court characterized abortion
liberalization as “widely prevalent” in Europe and aligned with the human rights standards that most
European countries recognize. Tribunal Constitutional [Constitutional Court] Feb. 23, 2010, Acórdão
no. 75/2012, § 7. See also Abortion Rights as Human Rights, supra note 2, at 772–73.
16
Siegel, supra note 14, at 355.
17
In a 2007 judgment, the Constitutional Court of Slovakia mined international human rights
texts to conclude that although the Constitution of Slovakia conferred value on potential life, it did not
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Consider the 2016 opinion of the Human Rights Committee (HRC),
Mellet v. Ireland.18 Evoking the justification of universalism, the HRC’s
majority view focused on why abortion restrictions undermine women’s
equality, as well as threaten privacy rights and the freedom from inhumane
treatment. Then, referring to consensus, the majority view found that
Ireland’s ban on abortion (except to save a pregnant woman’s life) was an
outlier in Europe.19 The HRC concluded that Ireland’s treatment of Mellet
violated her equal protection right under Article 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), among other rights.20
Mellet is an Irish citizen who, in her third trimester of pregnancy,
learned that the fetus she carried would die in utero or shortly after birth.21
To circumvent Irish abortion restrictions, she spent thousands of pounds to
travel to the United Kingdom to terminate her pregnancy; if she had
miscarried, she could have relied on state-subsidized medical and
psychological care at her local hospital.22 Weighing the financial, physical,
and psychological costs to Mellet, the HRC balanced competing interests
and found that the burden imposed on women in Mellet’s situation far
outweighed protecting the life of a fetus with a fatal medical condition.
Member Sarah Cleveland’s concurring view best captures human
rights arguments rooted in the universal value of women’s equality.
Cleveland argued that abortion restrictions, such as those in Ireland,
contradict international human rights law’s support for substantive gender
equality. She wrote,
The right to sex and gender equality and non-discrimination
obligates States to ensure that State regulations, including
with respect to access to health services, . . . do not directly
or indirectly discriminate on the basis of sex [and] require
States to protect on an equal basis, in law and in practice,
the unique needs of each sex. In particular, as this
establish a right to life for a fetus and no such right was recognized at the level of international law.
Nález Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky, sp. zn. [Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak
Republic, No.] PL. ÚS 12/01-297 (Dec. 4, 2007) (unofficial translation on file with the Center for
Reproductive Rights). See Abortion Rights as Human Rights, supra note 2, at 773–74.
18
Mellet v. Ireland, CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013, U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), (June 9,
2016), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013&Lang=E.
19
Id. ¶¶ 7.4, 7.8, 9.
20
Id. ¶ 7.11. In addition, the HRC found that, under Article 7, the toll of Mellet’s travel and lack
of aftercare “subjected her to conditions of intense physical and mental suffering.” Id. ¶ 7.4. Also, the
costs Mellet incurred by traveling to circumvent the Irish law amounted to an arbitrary interference with
her right to privacy under Article 17. Id. ¶ 7.8. The HRC did not find violations of Mellet’s rights under
Articles 2 (sex discrimination), 3 (right to competent tribunal), or 19 (freedom of expression).
21
Id. ¶ 2.2. Mellet’s midwife and physician advised her that she could travel to another country
for an abortion or “could carry to term, knowing that the fetus would most likely die inside her.” Id.
22
Id. ¶ 7.4, 7.8.
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Committee has recognized, nondiscrimination on the basis
of sex and gender obligates States to adopt measures to
achieve the “effective and equal empowerment of
women.”23
For Cleveland, the ICCPR’s right to equal protection as well as the
Article 2 prohibition of gender discrimination (which the HRC did not find
a violation of) prohibit the perpetuation of “traditional stereotypes regarding
the reproductive role of women, by placing the woman’s reproductive
function above her physical and mental health and autonomy.”24
In making these arguments, Cleveland cited the work of several
international human rights bodies, which have recognized that “differential
treatment of women based on gender stereotypes can give rise to gender
discrimination” and “tradition, history and culture” cannot justify gender
discrimination or gender stereotypes.25 The opinions of treaty-monitoring
bodies provide evidence of a consensus against criminal abortion bans and
of the universality of women’s reproductive rights. The same human rights
arguments undermine the appeals of states, like Ireland, to culture or
tradition to defend abortion restrictions.
Mellet, and specifically Cleveland’s view, provides powerful language
about women’s reproductive equality and autonomy, but enforcement of
aspects of the decision has proven difficult.26
The dilemma of
implementation is well known and is only one limitation, among others, of
human rights law.27 I highlight here two critiques that are salient to
reproductive rights advocacy, to which I will return in the last part.28
First, international human rights law is not neutral or politics free.29
23

Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis in the original).
Mellet, CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 ¶ 14.
25
Id. ¶ 15.
26
Deirdre Conroy, As Long as Enda Kenny is in Power, Women Like Amanda Mellet Will
Continue to Suffer, IR. INDEP. (June 15, 2016), http://www.independent.ie/opinion/comment/as-long-asenda-kenny-is-in-power-women-like-amanda-mellet-will-continue-to-suffer-34802557.html; Mark
O’Regan, State Could Cover Foetal Return Costs, IR. INDEP. (July 24, 2016), http://www.independent
.ie/irish-news/health/state-could-cover-foetal-return-costs-34907203.html.
27
See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in Critical Race Feminist
Perspective, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 510, 512–13 (2003); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935, 2012–13 (2002).
28
See Wendy Brown, “The Most We Can Hope For . . .”: Human Rights and the Politics of
Fatalism, 103 S. ATLANTIC Q. 451, 458 (2004) (“Rights, especially those as dependent on a universal
moral vocabulary as human rights are, hardly guarantee local political deliberation about how we should
live together; indeed, they may function precisely to limit or cancel such deliberation with
transcendental moral claims [or] refer it to the courts . . . .”); see generally Susan Marks, Human Rights
and Root Causes, 74 MODERN L. REV. 57, 78 (2011); Susan Marks, Four Human Rights Myths, LSE
LAW, SOC’Y AND ECON. WORKING PAPERS 10/2012, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS201
2-10_Marks.pdf.
29
Dianne Otto, Introduction, in GENDER ISSUES AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
24

02- REBOUCHE 4.24.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

How Radical is Reproductive Justice?

5/9/17 6:05 PM

15

Human rights law builds from liberal individualist traditions, and concepts
like modernity and consensus are informed by the priorities and politics of
the global North.30 The field’s potential conservatism and roots in
imperialism have led some feminists to contest that human rights can
provide an empowering language or emancipatory logic for women.31
And, second, litigation over abortion laws may not produce the
expected changes in the local delivery of reproductive healthcare.32 Rightsbased litigation can provide incomplete solutions to the complicated
problems associated with improving a country’s health care infrastructure.33
Even when courts or legislatures extend legal permission for abortion,
unintended consequences can follow law reform and impede the realization
of newly-won rights.34
To summarize a longstanding observation,
reproductive rights on paper do not necessarily translate to reproductive
rights in practice.35
If reproductive rights advocates do not make these arguments often, it
is perhaps because their victories seem fragile.36 Yet, the reproductive
OVERVIEW 6 (Dianne Otto ed., 2013) [hereinafter Introduction].
30
Brown, supra note at 28, at 455; SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HISTORY 5 (2012) [hereinafter THE LAST UTOPIA]; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Righting Wrongs, 103
S. ATLANTIC Q. 523, 524 (2004).
31
See Anne Orford, Feminism, Imperialism, and the Mission of International Law, 71 NORDIC J.
INT’L L. 275, 296 (2002); Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in
International Law over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 11–26 (2009); Sally Engle Merry,
Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing Women’s Human Rights to Protection from
Violence, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 343, 344–45 (2003); Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Transnational
Culture: Regulating Gender Violence Through Global Law, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 53, 54 (2006)
[hereinafter Human Rights and Transnational Culture]; Sari A. Kouvo, A “Quick And Dirty” Approach
to Women’s Emancipation and Human Rights?, 16 FEM. LEGAL STUD. 37, 39–40 (2008); Wendy Brown
& Janet Halley, Introduction, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 1, 25–33 (Wendy Brown & Janet
Halley eds., 2002).
32
See Alicia Ely Yamin, Promoting Equity in Health: What Role for Courts?, 16 HEALTH &
HUM. RTS. J. 1, 4 (2014) (noting the limitations of litigation in ensuring systemic change in health care
delivery and drawing an example from the litigation following the liberalization of abortion law in
Colombia).
33
Samuel Moyn writes, “One could imagine one man owning everything—an absolute
overlord—and he would not violate the current scheme of human rights, so long as everyone had their
basic rights fulfilled. Even perfectly realized human rights are compatible with radical inequality.”
Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Age of Inequality, OPENDEMOCRACY (Oct. 27, 2015),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/samuel-moyn/human-rights-and-age-of-inequality.
34
See Rachel Rebouché, The Limits of Reproductive Rights in Improving Women’s Health, 63
ALA. L. REV. 1, 26–35 (2011) (based on a case study of South Africa, demonstrating that enacting a
liberal abortion law had unintended consequences of provider and parental refusals, resulting in
logistical obstacles to abortion care).
35
Introduction, supra note 29, at 7.
36
In 2015, around the same time that the HRC considered Mellet, the HRC began drafting a new
comment on the right to life guaranteed by the ICCPR. The Committee received numerous submissions
on the duty to protect a fetus’s right to life. Human Rights Committee Discusses Draft General
Comment on the Right to Life, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS (July 14, 2015),
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justice movement has not been shy to criticize U.S. advocates for analogous
reasons. The next part explains how reproductive justice distinguishes its
mission from that of established reproductive rights organizations.
III.

Defining Reproductive Justice

Reproductive justice materials locate the movement’s origin at the
ICPD.37 A foundational text in defining reproductive justice, Undivided
Rights, described the influence of the conference: “[Founders of the Women
of Color Coalition for Reproductive Health Rights] connected their local
and national struggles to the global movement of women of color for
reproductive health that would, for the first time, incorporate human rights
framework into their activism.”38 Movement leaders, like the SisterSong
Collective for Women of Color, “connected the lack of reproductive
freedom for poor and marginalized women in the [United States], many of
whom are women of color, with that of women in developing countries.”39
Four movement commitments suggest a pioneering approach to both
organizing for social justice and to realizing better reproductive health for
women. First, reproductive justice is explicitly intersectional. Mainstream
reproductive rights organizations overlooked or disregarded the experiences
and issues of importance to women of color, low-income women, rural
women, and LGBTQI women, among others.40 The reproductive justice
movement draws directly from critical race theory and emphasizes, “control
[over] what happens to our bodies is constantly challenged by poverty,
[and] racism. . . .”41
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16234&LangID=E.
37
Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 61
(2014); Joan C. Chrisler, Introduction: A Global Approach to Reproductive Justice—Psychosocial and
Legal Aspects and Implications, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 1 (2013); Zakiya Luna & Kristin
Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 327, 328 (2013); MELISSA MURRAY &
KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE 528 (2015); JAEL SILLIMAN, MARLENE
GERBER FRIED, LORETTA ROSS, & ELENA GUTIÉRREZ, UNDIVIDED RIGHTS: WOMEN OF COLOR
ORGANIZING FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 49 (2004).
38
SILLIMAN, GERBER FRIED, ROSS, & GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 37, at 49.
39
Id.; see also Jennifer Nelson, Women of Color and the Movement for Reproductive Justice: A
Human Rights Agenda, in MORE THAN MEDICINE: A HISTORY OF THE FEMINIST WOMEN’S HEALTH
MOVEMENT 194 (2015).
40
Kimala Price, What is Reproductive Justice? How Women of Color Activists are Redefining
the Pro-Choice Paradigm, 10 MERIDIANS 42, 54 (2010); Sarah London, Reproductive Justice:
Developing a Lawyering Model, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y 71, n.59 (2011); see generally
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY 56–57, 100–04 (1997) (“[T]he movement to expand women’s reproductive options was
marked by racism from its very inception”).
41
Loretta Ross et al., Just Choices: Women of Color, Reproductive Health, and Human Rights,
in POLICING THE NATIONAL BODY: SEX, RACE, AND CRIMINALIZATION 147 (Jael Silliman, Angela Davis
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Second, reproductive justice has incorporated a critique of “choice”
and specifically of U.S. privacy rights. Reproductive justice writings
emphasize that the traditional rhetoric around abortion rights “fits best the
situation of relatively privileged women in Western, industrialized nations”
because that framework “requires that a woman know that she has
reproductive rights, that her nation and her community acknowledge those
rights, and that she is able to exercise them.”42 This draws from the work of
feminist scholars, who have argued that a right grounded in individual
decision making is stunted and unrealistic, especially when it receives little
state support.43 Exercising one’s privacy rights can be a privilege; women
at the mercy of state bureaucracies—receiving public assistance or new to
the country, for example—cannot afford to opt-out of state surveillance or
state interference.44
Third, reproductive justice looks beyond abortion and addresses a wide
range of reproductive health care throughout an individual’s life. Zakiya
Luna and Kristin Luker, in distinguishing reproductive rights from
reproductive justice, define “reproductive justice [as] equally about the right
to not have children, the right to have children, the right to parent with
dignity, and the means to achieve these rights.”45 A reproductive justice
agenda includes issues such as sex education, post-natal and prenatal care,
childcare support, and the treatment of incarcerated women, just to name a
few.46
Finally, reproductive justice calls for community-based strategies for
improving reproductive health policy and not just reliance on courts or
rights. Lindsay Wiley writes that the innovation of reproductive justice is
the “commitment to participatory engagement by the poor and socially
marginalized in decision-making processes”—a “shift away from
substantive law reform . . . and toward a process-based conception of social
justice lawyering as a democratic, participatory, collaborative project to
ensure recognition of and self-determination for marginalized

& Anannya Bhattacharjee eds., 2002).
42
Chrisler, supra note 37, at 2.
43
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 31
(2004) (arguing for conceptions of dependency that are collective and confer responsibility on the state,
state bodies, and the market to support dependency and care work); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S
RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY, AND LAW 27–28 (2011); ROSALIND
P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE
FREEDOM 388 (1984).
44
See Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 113,
117–22 (2011).
45
Luna & Luker, supra note 37, at 343.
46
Price, supra note 40, at 59; Luna & Luker, supra note 37, at 341.
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individuals.”47 Reproductive justice advocates seek to work through local
networks that affect people’s reproductive decisions and deliver
reproductive health services.48
In addition to community organizing, reproductive justice engages
with law’s effect on the availability of reproductive health care. Related to
abortion, funding restrictions and the proliferation of TRAP laws—the
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers—have imposed significant
burdens on abortion providers and on the delivery of abortion services in
the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court recently weighed the costs
imposed by a TRAP law in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.49 The
Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute that required abortion clinics to
operate as ambulatory surgical centers and physicians to have admitting
privileges at nearby hospitals.50 The Supreme Court held that Planned
Parenthood v. Casey’s undue burden standard requires courts to balance the
benefits and burdens a law imposes on the constitutional right to abortion.51
After a detailed review of the number of women affected, the number of
clinics that would close, the number of miles between clinics, the Court
held that the Texas privileges and ambulatory surgical center requirements
offered no health benefit and resulted in burdens of cost, travel, and time.52
Reproductive justice has played an important role in highlighting the
costs of TRAP laws, often providing the context and the information for
how marginalized and low-income women suffer under restrictive
statutes.53 At the same time, reproductive justice advocates recognize the
47

Wiley, supra note 37, at 101.
In the abortion context, for instance, there has been recent attention to the prevalence of selfinduced abortion. The Berkeley Center for Reproductive Rights and Justice has undertaken a five-year
project to understand and to expand women’s ability to gain access to self-induced abortion. The Center
plans to study the local and state laws that penalize self-induction and to “build a cadre of lawyers and
scholars poised to fight for self-determined abortion care.” Jill E. Adams & Melissa Mikesell, Primer on
Self-Induced Abortion, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAW, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/SIA-LegalTeam-Primer.pdf.
49
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
50
Id. at 2293.
51
Id. at 2310 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
52
Id. at 2311, 2314, 2318.
53
Through interviews with women denied abortion care, the Turnaround Study—a self-described reproductive justice project—demonstrated that poor and marginalized women bear the brunt of
abortion restrictions and that limited or poor quality reproductive health care, including termination
services, perpetuates cycles of poverty. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT, TWO SIDES
OF THE SAME COIN: INTEGRATING ECONOMIC AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE (2015), http://rhtp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/Two-Sides-of-the-Same-Coin-Integrating-Economic-and-Reproductive-Justice.
pdf [hereinafter Turnaround Study]; see also Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas, Urbanormativity,
Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 76,
77–78, 81–83 (2014) (demonstrating the heavy burdens that TRAP laws impose on women who are both
rural and poor).
48
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limits of Supreme Court cases and the explication of constitutional rights in
providing on-the-ground change.54 In comparing Mellet to Whole Woman’s
Health, both cases weighed the impediments to services imposed by
abortion restrictions. In Whole Woman’s Health, however, the Court did
not mention women’s equality or autonomy or dignity.55 The U.S.
reproductive justice movement notices this difference: U.S. decisions often
do not ground abortion rights in women’s rights to substantive equality or
in human rights provisions.56 As one response, reproductive justice seeks
“to ‘Bring Cairo Home’ by adapting agreements from the [ICPD]
Programme of Action to a U.S. specific context.”57 The final part considers
what human rights might or might not achieve for reproductive justice
strategies in the United States.
IV.

The Intersection of Human Rights and Reproductive
Justice

I conclude by questioning if the movement’s references to human
rights detract from its ambitions and priorities. Reproductive justice
materials refer to human rights as foundational to the movement
commitments just described.58 To be clear, reproductive justice advocates
likely understand all too well the limitations of human rights. However,
reproductive justice writings are surprisingly thin in their account of what
human rights achieve or the state of human rights law today. This is,
perhaps, a function of the use to which human rights rhetoric is put.
Scholars’ and advocates’ writings rely on human rights to bolster their
arguments and not to bring cases.
But I believe it matters if reproductive justice advocates embrace
human rights, for whatever purpose, without skepticism of human rights
law. Without the same questioning of what discourses actually accomplish
and what groups they include or exclude, reproductive justice may invite a
co-optation of movement principles that its leaders fear—taking the label of
reproductive justice, but not investing in its values.59
54
Cynthia Soohoo, Human Rights Could Influence Whole Woman’s Health, HUMAN RIGHTS AT
HOME BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2016/02/human-rightscould-influence-whole-womans-health-1.html.
55
On the other hand, Whole Woman’s Health has immediate effect; it is enforceable in ways that
Mellet is not.
56
Soohoo, supra note 54, at 1.
57
Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights Change Home, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 497–98 (2008).
58
Interviews with movement leaders led sociologist Kimala Price to conclude that “human rights
doctrine has taken center stage in the reproductive justice framework.” Price, supra note 40, at 49.
59
Luna & Luker, supra note 37, at 329; Zakiya T. Luna, “The Phrase of the Day:” Examining
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Contemporary writings on reproductive justice emphasize an
expansive take on human rights—civil and political as well as social and
economic, positive and negative rights, substantive and formal equality,
immediately enforceable or progressively realized rights.60
Some
reproductive justice materials nonetheless invoke a conception of human
rights that starts from the premise of individual-based, state-centered
protections, even when thicker accounts would better serve activists’
goals.61 The SisterSong website, for example, announces, “[Reproductive
justice] is based on the internationally-accepted Declaration of Human
Rights upheld by the United Nations, a comprehensive body of law that
details the rights of individuals and the responsibilities of government to
protect those rights.”62
The SisterSong description simplifies the legacies and trajectory of the
field, and it takes for granted the universality of human rights.63 Yet the
universal application of women’s rights is contested ground. Recall
Cleveland’s argument in Mellet—“tradition, history and culture” cannot
justify practices or laws that result in gender discrimination or stereotypes.
However, a well-known source of disagreement among feminists is how to

Contexts and Co-optation of Reproductive Justice Activism in the Women’s Movement, in RESEARCH IN
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICT AND CHANGE 219, 230 (Patrick G. Coy ed., 2011); see also Brown,
supra note 28, at 460 (“It is hard to parse cynical from sincere deployments of human rights discourse
and to separate human rights campaigns from legitimating liberal imperialism.”).
60
Founders of the reproductive justice movement write: “Many women of color reproductive
rights activists increasingly find the human rights framework, successfully used by anti-racist and antifascist movements worldwide, to be one of the best ways of articulating and advancing their rights.
Linking civil, political, economic, sexual and social rights, it bridges the gap between having legal rights
and lacking the economic resources to access those rights. Those women of color who embrace the
existing global human rights framework do so in order to locate reproductive freedom within a broad
movement for human rights.” SILLIMAN, GERBER FRIED, ROSS, & GUTIÉRREZ, supra note 37, at 49.
61
Brown, supra note 28, at 455 (“to the extent that human rights are understood as the ability to
protect oneself against injustice and define one’s own ends in life, this is a form of “empowerment” that
fully equates empowerment with liberal individualism”); JANET HALLEY, PRABHA KOTISWARAN,
RACHEL REBOUCHÉ, & HILA SHAMIR, GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: AN INTRODUCTION 24 (forthcoming
2017) (“Freedom and equality in American liberal-centrist feminism are recurrently understood to inhere
in rights. This brings a constitutive legal formalism and a willingness to rely on the state into the project.
It also structures in, at the foundation, an emphasis on the individual rather than the collective as the
primary subject of moral and political concern.”) (on file with the author).
62
Reproductive Justice, SISTERSONG: WOMEN OF COLOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE COLLECTIVE,
http://sistersong.net/reproductive-justice/.
63
For example, as part of its grassroots activism, SisterSong hands out copies of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Reproductive Justice, SISTERSONG: WOMEN OF COLOR REPRODUCTIVE
JUSTICE COLLECTIVE, http://sistersong.net/reproductive-justice/. Kimala Price also notes that SisterSong
distributes free copies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to its grassroots constituencies.
Price, supra note 40, at 49. For an alternative account of human rights ascendancy in international law,
see THE LAST UTOPIA, supra note 30, at 4 (arguing that human rights campaigns took on their present
force in the 1970s and not the 1940s with the drafting of the UDHR, which reflected greater attention to
duties than rights).
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square universalism with a “developing world perspective,” particularly
when that perspective embraces cultures and traditions viewed as
antithetical to human rights.64
Feminists engaged in postcolonial critique have challenged North
American and Western European advocates who may too readily
characterize women in the global South as people in need of saving or as
“dupes of patriarchy.”65 They note that women’s human rights campaigns
often depict only “Third World” practices or beliefs as harmful to women.
Ratna Kapur writes,
Generalizations [of “women in the Third World”] are
hegemonic in that they represent the problems of privileged
women, who are often (though not exclusively) white,
Western, middle-class, heterosexual women. These
generalizations efface the problems, perspectives, and
political concerns of women marginalized because of their
class, race, religion, ethnicity, and/or sexual orientation.
The victim subject ultimately relies on a universal subject:
a subject that resembles the uncomplicated subject of
liberal discourse. It is a subject that cannot accommodate a
multi-layered experience.66
Feminists in the global South have reacted against such labels or law
reform efforts, and they point to how feminist arguments can be co-opted
by colonializing powers to justify their control.67 They suspect, too, that the
human rights agendas supported by the global North divorce women’s
rights from projects that target international economic relations or the
inequalities produced by the global economy.68
The insights of post-colonial feminism reveal a tension in reproductive

64
See Brems, supra note 11, at 153–59. Karen Engle, Feminist Governance and International
Law: From Liberal Inclusion to Carceral Feminism, in GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: NOTES FROM THE
FIELD (Janet Halley et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) (“Early Third World feminist
critiques . . . called attention to cultural differences they believed were ignored or misunderstood by
women’s human rights advocates, as well as to the failure of those advocates to see similarities of
oppression in their own Western cultures.”).
65
Uma Narayan, Minds of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural Practices, and Other
Women, in A MIND OF ONE’S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY 418 (Louise M.
Antony & Charlotte E. Witt eds., 2d ed. 2002); see also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern
Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 296 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg
eds., 1988); Lewis, supra note 27, at 512–13.
66
Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the ‘Native’ Subject in
International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 1, 6 (2002).
67
See SITAL KALANTRY, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL MIGRATION: SEX-SELECTIVE
ABORTION LAW AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (introduction to book on file with the
author).
68
Lewis, supra note 27, at 518; Kapur, supra note 66, at 34.
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justice advocacy. On the one hand, reproductive justice seeks to reflect the
experiences of marginalized women, including women in the global South.
On the other hand, reproductive justice ignores how human rights advocacy
often reflects U.S. experience and priorities. U.S. abortion law, for instance,
has been both a model and anti-model. Courts all over the world
consistently cite Roe v. Wade, but without mention of the restrictions that
followed.69 At the same time, U.S. advocates look to human rights to
expand what they perceive as courts’ limited interpretations of domestic,
constitutional rights.70 So, Whole Woman’s Health meets Mellet.
A consequence of U.S. influence may be that human rights approaches
shift the focus of advocacy to abortion litigation. Although reproductive
justice materials seek to move beyond litigation strategies, human rights
protections typically depend on lawyers and courts to fill out their
meaning.71 Thus, while reproductive justice questions the overreliance on
courts or the ability of rights to translate into health services, human rights
lawyers and the materials produced by legal organizations continue to focus
on abortion rights.72
In contrast, research in public health law calls for policy interventions
that can improve pregnant women’s standard of living. For instance, work
on the social determinants of health explores the class and income
inequalities that perpetuate cycles of poor health for individuals and
populations.73 Where we live, work, learn—our daily environments and
stressors—powerfully shape our health, and those with low incomes, living
at the sharp end of inequality, negotiate significant obstacles to leading
healthy lives.74 Social determinants research demonstrates that increases in
individual and family income at the lowest end of the socio-economic scale

69

Rachel Rebouché, Comparative Pragmatism, 72 MD. L. REV. 85, 124–30 (2014).
Soohoo & Stolz, supra note 57, at 479 (contrasting equal protection under the U.S.
Constitution and substantive equality under CEDAW). Soohoo and Stolz write, “Like early transnational
movements concerning the abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage, reproductive justice activists
acknowledge the value of learning from movements in other countries. In particular, they recognize the
value of learning from the experience had by advocates from other countries in using international
human rights standards, especially economic, social, and cultural human rights, as part of their
organizing work.” Id. at 498.
71
See Human Rights and Transnational Culture, supra note 31, at 57–58, 65.
72
See, e.g., Brief of National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 16–19, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15274) (referring to litigation around the world that relies on human rights principles in striking down
restrictive abortion laws).
73
See Scott Burris, From Health Care Law to the Social Determinants of Health: A Public
Health Law Research Perspective, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2011).
74
See Rachel Rebouché & Scott Burris, The Social Determinants of Health, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 1099 (William Sage et al. eds., 2016) (describing social determinants
research as it relates to income inequality and redistribution of wealth).
70
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produce the greatest improvements in population health.75
Likewise, health justice strategies concentrate on “social change that
transforms the current systems of neglect, bias, and privilege into
systems—policies, practices, institutions—that truly support healthy
communities for all.”76 Health justice purports to be an ecological model
that views “recognition and redistribution as distinct, and potentially
compatible, goals.”77 Thus, health justice is not only concerned with who
has access to health care, but with policies that ensure the poorest do not
shoulder a disproportionate burden in a health care system.78 Because of
this, health justice writings, though not uniformly, express skepticism of
human rights’ ability to ensure a fair allocation of limited resources or to
address the “harsh social distress of most of the world’s population.”79
Acute power and income disparities get left behind, creating a gap between
the pronouncements of human rights and the practiced realities of health
care provision across the socio-economic spectrum. Audrey Chapman
argued that,
[A] human rights approach rarely considers inequalities in
economic status and social class to be problematic unless
they interfere with the realization of human rights or are
implicated in differential treatment by the state. . . . Human
rights law is concerned with disparities in the enjoyment of
rights rather than differentials in social position, access to
resources, and political power.80
75
Take income transfer strategies as examples. In the United States, the income tax experiments
of the 1970s demonstrated that providing low-income pregnant women with additional cash correlated
with higher birth weights of babies. Id. (citing Hilary W. Hoynes, Douglas L. Miller, & David Simon,
Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Infant Health, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., WORKING
PAPER SERIES (2012), https://gspp.berkeley.edu/assets/uploads/research/pdf/Hoynes-Miller-SimonAEJPolicy-Feb-2015.pdf).
76
Wiley, supra note 37, at 97.
77
Id. at 99.
78
Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, Conclusion: Contexts for the Promise and Peril of the Right
to Health, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY
480 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014). Health justice scholars call for political solidarity
and political strategy beyond the legal battles of courtrooms. Id. at 473 (citing the scholarship of Paul
Farmer). But health advocates also are quick to note the dangers of framing health rights in terms of
progressive realization that is dependent on policy makers. Id. at 474 (citing the scholarship of Lucie
White).
79
Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, Introduction: Marrying Human Rights and Health Care
Systems: Contexts for a Power to Improve Access and Equity, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 13–16 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross
eds., 2014); see, e.g., MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA supra note 30, at 3.
80
Audrey Chapman, The Social Determinants of Health, Health Equity, and Human Rights, 12
EALTH
& HUM. RTS. 17, 23 (2010); see also Peter Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Co-opting the Health
H
and Human Rights Movement, 30 J. L. MED. ETHICS 705, 705 (2002) (arguing that human rights rhetoric
has been co-opted by opponents to public health law reform by focusing on individual rights, rather than
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Addressing questions of budget or service delivery are priorities that
agendas for equality, dignity, and autonomy may embrace, but may not
completely reach.81
There is a gulf between social determinants or health justice
approaches and reproductive rights, which may highlight what human rights
may lack: human rights strategies often do not address how income and
class shape a pregnant women’s life opportunities.82 This is not to suggest
that advocates are blind to the relationship between poverty and the
availability or accessibility of termination services.83 Reproductive justice
organizations have focused on the redistribution of resources and wealth.84
But research or advocacy attuned to people’s everyday needs is difficult and
it is complicated. The critical aspects of reproductive justice ideology can
illuminate pathways for reform that take seriously the state’s duty to
provide a social safety net—social assistance that is local, expensive, but
effective.85
CONCLUSION
As a complement to human rights rhetoric, movement strategies
attuned to systemic health problems, which rely on practical tools for
collective action, may help advocates explore new solidarities, new roles for
institutions, and new visions for socio-economic protections. This is one of
the goals of the reproductive justice movement—to build alliances among
groups and people that work toward eradicating present day inequalities in

collective or socio-economic rights, and urging public health advocates to reclaim human rights for
community-based interventions).
81
Alicia Ely Yamin, Shades of Dignity: Exploring the Demands of Equality in Applying the
Human Rights Frameworks to Health, 11 HEALTH & HUM. RTS 1, 2 (2009).
82
Chapman, supra note 80, at 22.
83
An example is the Turnaround Study, described supra note 53.
84
Rosalinda Pineda Orfeneo, Economic and Reproductive Justice in the Context of Women in
the Informal Economy, 2 ASIAN BIOETHICS REV. 19, 19 (2010) (describing reproductive justice and
economic justice discourses as indivisible movements, like human rights).
85
Michelle Bates Deakin, A Work in Progress, HARV. L. BULLETIN, FALL 2016, 11,
https://today.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/HLB_fall_16_NCN.pdf (quoting Moyn:
“The possibility emerges that human rights symbolize our commitment to global solidarity, but in a form
that is weak and cheap, while welfare states enacted solidarity that, although local, was strong and
expensive.”). See Martha A. Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J.
251, 272 (2010) (“To the extent that these legally constituted institutions distribute significant social
goods, they should be monitored by the state. State involvement in the creation and maintenance of these
institutions requires that the state be vigilant in ensuring that the distribution of such assets is
accomplished with attention to public values, including equality or justice, or objectives beyond private
or profit motivation. . . . Specifically, some are privileged by the structure and operation of these
institutions, while others are relatively disadvantaged and left to cope with their shared vulnerability on
an individual level.”).
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pursuit of a fairer and more just society.86 The connections that human
rights can build among social movements are powerful and important;
reproductive justice’s commitments, in turn, might better tether human
rights discourses to the work of local, political engagement.

86

Orfeneo, supra note 84, at 21.

